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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of the study was to verify, through the use of an experimental method, the assumption that the 
‘economic human’ pays more attention to the externality he/she causes as the strength of externality increases. We 
used a social-experiment design within an undergraduate classroom to test assumptions, using statistical method. 
A lakeside plant was used as an example. Our results confirmed the following: (1) 66% of subjects behaved 
altruistically, while the remainder (34%) behaved selfishly, suggesting that the assumption of mainstream 
economics may not be appropriate; (2) when we compared situations in which the plots with the natural resource 
(e.g. the plant) to which the economic human had property rights were large or small in number, those who 
possessed larger plots tended to be more conservative in resource use; and (3) when we compared situations where 
the economic human’s extent of influence on natural resources was large or small, those with greater influence 
tended to be more conservative in resource use. Although mainstream economics assumes a rational economic 
human—who is supposedly selfish—our results suggest that altruistic behaviour dominates selfish behaviour, and 
that altruistic behavior should be taken into greater consideration when making policy. 
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INTRODUCTION  
Mainstream economics assumes the so-called 
rational economic human (‘homo 
economicus’), who supposedly ignores 
externality. Thus, it follows that the behaviour 
of the rational economic human will remain the 
same, whether or not there is any externality. 
The above explanation is provided in standard 
textbooks of mainstream economics, under the 
assumption that there is no social penalty for 
generating externality. 
However, is it truly realistic to assume that 
externality is not considered by the economic 
human? It might be more natural to suppose 
that we feel sorry for others if we cause some 
externality, even when there is no social 
penalty. The assumption might be especially 
questionable when the behaviour of a rational 
economic human brings to bear substantial 
negative external effects on society as a whole. 
It seems more realistic to assume that each  
 
economic human pays some attention to others 
when his/her behaviour bears substantial 
negative effects on society as a whole. Besides, 
recently, doubts have been raised whether 
sustainable development can be achieved 
under the assumption of ‘homo economicus’ 
(Becker 2006). Kahneman (2003) suggests that 
economic agents are bounded rational and a 
series of results of ultimatum games seems to 
support his suggestion. The purpose of this 
paper is to verify, through the use of an 
experimental method, the assumption that the 
economic human pays more attention to the 
externality he/she causes as the strength of 
externality increases. Specifically, we examined 
the following two assumptions. In the first 
examination, we compared situations where 
the extent of natural resources to which the 
economic human had property rights was large 
or small; we expected that as the extent of 
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natural resources to which the economic 
human had property rights became larger, the 
economic human would exert a greater effort to 
reduce externality (hypothesis 1). In the second 
examination, we compared situations where 
the extent of natural resources to which the 
economic human exerts influence is large or 
small; we expected that as the extent of natural 
resources to which the economic human exerts 
influence grew, the economic human would 
exert greater effort to reduce externality 
(hypothesis 2). 
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
The subjects were undergraduate students who 
attended the lecture ‘Agriculture and 
Economics’, delivered by the author. In all, 196 
students took part, of whom 94% were first-
year students. The lecture and therefore the 
experiment took place on 17 June 2011. The 75-
min lecture was followed by the 15-min 
experiment. In the lecture, students were 
provided explanations of the mechanisms 
underlying environmental issues in the field of 
agriculture; the information provided to the 
students in this lecture gave them the 
knowledge needed to understand the 
experiment and answer questions pertaining to 
it. The following scenario was assumed in the 
experiment. There is a scenic lake, and there are 
one or more landowner(s) who possess (es) 
lakeside property, which is divided into 100 m 
  by 100 m plots. In each lakeside plot, a plant 
with some economic value grows wild, and 
each landowner (in the experiment, each 
subject is assumed to be a landowner) harvests 
this plant to sell it in the market and gain 
income each year. The price of the plant is 
constant and does not depend on the total 
amount of harvest by all landowners. The 
lakeside area where the plant grows wild is also 
an important site for the growth of larval fish 
and the habitat of migratory birds. In the 
experiment, we supposed three types of lake 
area, with boundary lengths of 10 km (100 
plots), 50 km (500 plots), and 100 km (1,000 
plots). The subject assumed to be the 
landowner was assigned lakeside plots. The 
number of plots assigned to each subject 
accounted for 1%, 10%, 25%, 50%, or 75% of all 
lakeside plots. It followed, therefore, that there 
were 15 cases (i.e. 3 cases of lake area × 5 cases 
of plot assignment). Boundary length was set 
based on that of the largest lake in Japan—
Biwa, whose boundary length is 241 km. The 
subject was posed the following conditions. 
First, if the subject were to harvest the plant in 
his/her plots, his/her income would vary 
according to the amount harvested; however, 
the amount of harvest would not influence the 
volumes of fish caught or the number of water 
birds visiting the lake of that year (i.e. there is 
no externality for fishermen and visitors within 
a year). Second, however, if the landowner 
were to harvest the plant this year, doing so 
may cause an externality after the next year; Fig. 
1 provides the assumed influences of the 
harvest of one year on the harvest, fish catches, 
and number of water birds of the next year. As 
seen in Figure 1, a change of a few percentage 
points of harvest can prompt drastic changes in 
subsequent harvests, fish catches, and numbers 
of water birds. It was explained in the lecture 
that regime shifts can bring about such drastic 
changes (Thom, 1975; Scheffer et al., 2001; 
Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003). 
Each subject was posed with the total lake area 
(e.g. boundary length of the lake is 100 km and 
the number of plots is 1,000) and the rate of plot 
assignment (e.g. subject had 500 of 1,000 plots). 
The subject was also asked how many plots 
he/she would harvest this year; for the sake of 
simplicity, we supposed that if the subject 
decided to harvest, he/she would harvest all 
the plants in each plot. It was assumed that the 
subject had little knowledge of the behaviour of 
other landowners. Next, the rate of plot 
assignment was changed (e.g. subject had 750 
of 1,000 plots), and the subject was once again 
asked how many plots he/she would harvest 
this year. 
As stated above, the purpose of this paper was 
to examine, through the use of an experimental 
method, the hypothesis that the economic 
human pays greater attention to the externality 
that he/she causes as the strength of the 
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externality increases. The background of this 
hypothesis and the method of verification are 
provided below. Roughly speaking, there are 
two types of landowner: one type is selfish, and 
the other is altruistic. Here, ‘selfish’ and 
‘altruistic’ suggest that externality towards 
other economic humans (e.g. fishermen and 
visitors) is ignored and considered, 
respectively. For the sake of simplicity, each 
subject expects all other landowners to be either 
selfish or altruistic. If the subject supposes all 
other landowners to be altruistic, he/she will 
expect all other landowners to harvest 30% 
their plots (i.e. 30% is the largest percentage, 
under the constraint of no externality towards 
others). If the subject supposes that all other 
landowners are selfish, he/she will expect all 
other landowners to harvest 50% of their plots 
(i.e. 50% is the largest percentage, under the 
constraint of no loss in the subject’s future 
income). Here, we ignore the possibility of 
myopic decision making. As we will see later in 
the paper, less than 1% of subjects were 
classified as showing myopic (i.e. 
unreasonable) decision-making; therefore, it 
should be appropriate to assume that the other 
landowners will not show myopic decision-
making, either. Each subject is assumed to be 
risk-neutral. 
Under the aforementioned scenario, it follows 
that the rate of plot use varied between 0% and 
100%, depending on the subject’s expectations 
vis-à-vis the typology of the other landowners. 
Besides, as shown in Table 1, there were ranges 
of reasonable rate of plot use for the subject, 
and each rate depended on the type of subject 
and the subject’s expectations vis-à-vis the 
typology of the other landowners. For example, 
when the subject was altruistic and the subject 
expected the other landowners to be selfish, 
and if the subject’s rate of plot assignment was 
50%, the rate of plot use by subject should have 
been less than 10%, as shown in Table 1. 
Unreasonable cases are those that do not ‘fit’ 
with the above cases, where subjects and other 
landowners are selfish and/or altruistic. A 
unreasonable case would not occur when the 
subject’s rate of plot assignment was 1%, 10%, 
or 25%. A unreasonable case happened when 
the subject’s rate of plot assignment was 50% or 
100%, and where the total rate of plot use was 
greater than 50% if the subject’s rate of plot use 
was between 71% and 100% and 58% and 100%, 
respectively. As a result, although it was 
possible for the subject to realise a rate of plot 
use less than 50%, the subject would use more 
than 50% and reduce the income of both the 
subject and the other landowners in the next 
year. However, it is still possible to explain 
such cases. For example, one possibility might 
be the case where the subject substantially 
discounts the present value of profits from the 
plant harvest, because the subject’s subjective 
discount rate is high. (There is another, similar 
situation, where the subject expects the 
subjective discount rates of other landowners 
to be substantially high, and he/she also sets 
his/her subjective discount rate high.) In such 
cases, if the subject’s rate of plot assignment 
were 50%, the rate of plot use would be 
between 71% and 100%; if the rate of the 
subject’s rate of plot assignment were 75%, plot 
use would be between 58% and 100%, as shown 
in Table 1. Next, we examined the two 
hypotheses of this paper. First, let us examine 
hypothesis 1. (We compared situations where 
the extent of natural resources to which the 
economic human had property rights were 
large or small; we expected that as the extent of 
natural resources grew, the economic human 
would exert a greater effort to reduce 
externality). Based on Table 1, we expected that 
if the subject were altruistic and the other 
landowners selfish, then the following 
statement would hold: as the rate of assignment 
of subject grew, the rate of plot use would also 
grow. However, for this statement to hold, it 
was necessary that this scenario (i.e. where the 
subject and other landowners are altruistic and 
selfish, respectively) represent the majority of 
cases; therefore, it is expected this statement 
will not hold. In addition, we can point out the 
following. 
(1) As the number of plots increases, the 
amount of subject income will increase, and the 
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subject can then more readily consider his/her 
impact on the environment. 
 This logic is the same as that of the 
Environmental Kuznets curve (Grossman & 
Krueger, 1991; Shafik & Bandyopadhyay, 1992), 
where as the per-capita GDP exceeds some 
limit, one can consider environmental issues 
more seriously. In a related move, Johansson-
Stenman (2005, p. 101) states in the abstract of 
his study that ‘this paper shows that rich 
countries in a free unregulated market may still 
undertake globally efficient abatement 
investments [for global environmental 
problems], given the existence of limited non-
paternalistic altruism’. (2) The impact of one 
plot harvest would be the same when this plot 
belonged to those who were assigned many 
plots, versus those who were assigned few 
plots. However, the subject may think that 
his/her impact on harvest per plot will be 
insignificant, if he/she had few plots. On the 
other hand, the subject may think that his/her 
impact on harvest per plot will be high, if 
he/she had many plots. This is the same logic 
used in the Tragedy of Commons (Hardin, 
1968). (3) If the rate of plot assignment is large, 
the subject will lessen the uncertainty caused by 
other landowners’ behaviour. In such a 
situation, the subject’s effort to conserve will be 
effective (i.e. the subject’s altruistic behaviour 
can become more effective). 
Therefore, there is a good possibility that 
hypothesis 1 holds.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Influence of harvest of one year on the harvest, fish catches, and the number of water birds in 
the next year. 
Second, let us examine hypothesis 2. (We 
compared situations where the extent of the 
natural resources over which the economic 
human exerts influence was large or small [e.g. 
lake size]. We expected that as the extent of 
natural resources grew, the economic human 
would exert a greater effort to reduce 
externality.) In general, externality will grow as 
the scale of the object becomes larger. If the 
behaviour of the subject were not economically 
rational and externality were considered, it 
seems appropriate to hypothesise that 
externality will be considered more seriously as 
the size of the lake grows.  
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Table 1. Expectations vis-à-vis the rate of plot use. 
Subject Altruistic Altruistic Selfish Selfish 
Nonreasonable Other 
landowners† 
Selfish Altruistic Selfish Altruistic 
1% 0% 1～30% 31～50% 51～100% – 
10% 0% 1～30% 31～50% 51～100% – 
25% 0% 1～30% 31～50% 51～100% – 
50% 10% 11～30% 31～50% 51～70% 71～100% 
75% 23% 24～30% 31～50% 51～57% 58～100% 
†1% to 75% in the leftmost column is the rate of assignment for subject. 
 
RESULTS 
Table 2 provides the average rates of plot use, 
which were calculated based on the replies of 
subjects, for 15 cases. On average, 25 subjects 
provided an answer for each case. When we 
compared within the 10-km, 50-km, and 100-
km rows, in order, the average rate of plot use 
decreased as the rate of plot assignment 
increased. Suppose the null hypothesis was 
that there was no difference in harvest rate 
among the cases; also suppose an alternative 
hypothesis that the average rate of plot use 
depends on the rate of plot assignment. 
Applying the Friedman test for 10 km, 50 km, 
and 100 km, the 𝜒2 values were 44.5, 75.1, and 
42.0, respectively; for these three cases, the null 
hypothesis was rejected at the 1% significance 
level. Therefore, hypothesis 1 was verified 
empirically—that is, as the extent of natural 
resources for which the economic human had 
property rights grows, the economic human 
would exert greater effort to reduce externality. 
There was one caveat: the 10 km–1% pair had a 
rate of 83.3%, which was substantially higher 
than those of the others. This was because 
subjects were asked to answer with an integral 
number (e.g. 1% of 100 plots is one plot; 
therefore, in the case of the 10 km–1% pair, 
subjects had to select either zero plots or one 
plot).  
Next, we compared within the 1% to 75% 
columns; the average rate of plot use decreased 
as the rate of plot assignment increased in the 
case of the 1% column. For the 25%, 50%, and 
75% cases, the average rate of plot use took a 
minimum value when the boundary length was 
50 km.  
 
It followed that we could not verify hypothesis 
2, based on this examination. We conducted an 
additional examination. Under hypothesis 2, it 
was expected that as the number of plots grew, 
subjects would tend to be altruistic, and that 
whenever the rate of assignment were small, 
subjects would tend to be selfish (hypothesis 
2’). Table 2 classifies harvest rates based on 
subject typology and on the type of other 
landowners expected by the subject. For 
example, in the case of the 500 plots–75% pair, 
based on Table 1, if a subject were to reply with 
some rate between 0% and 23%, that subject 
must regard him/herself as altruistic and 
others as selfish (see the 75% case in Table 1). 
As shown in Table 2, 39% of the subjects expect 
the case involving the 500 plots–75% pair. 
When the number of plots was 100, 500, and 
1,000 and other landowners were selfish, 7%, 
9%, and 6% of subjects were altruistic, 
respectively. When the number of plots was 
100, 500, and 1,000 and other landowners were 
altruistic, 45%, 54%, and 66% of subjects were 
altruistic, respectively. We confirmed the 
tendency that as the number of plots grew, so 
too did the proportion of altruistic subjects.  On 
the other hand, when the number of plots was 
100, 500, and 1,000 and other landowners were 
selfish, 25%, 24%, and 20% of subjects were 
altruistic, respectively. When the number of 
plots was 100, 500, and 1,000 and other 
landowners were altruistic, 22%, 11%, and 8% 
of subjects were selfish, respectively. We 
confirmed the tendency that when the total 
number of plots was small, there was a greater 
proportion of selfish subjects. Although we 
could not conduct statistical tests for  
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Table 2. Results of the average rate of plot use. 
Boundary 
length 
Number 
of plots 
 Hypothesis 1 Hypothesis 2     
Subject: 
Other landowners: 
 Altruistic 
Selfish 
Altruistic 
Altruistic 
Selfish 
Selfish 
Selfish 
Altruistic 
Unreasonable 
Rate of plot 
assignment 
 
Result Average Result Average Result Average Result Average Result Average 
10 km 100 
1% 83.3% 17% 
7% 
– 
45% 
– 
25% 
83% 
22% 
– 
1% 
10% 37.8% 0% 59% 33% 7% – 
25% 36.9% 0% 46% 38% 15% – 
50% 32.3% 0% 77% 19% 4% 0% 
75% 31.3% 19% 44% 33% 0% 4% 
50 km 500 
1% 42.1% 0% 
9% 
43% 
54% 
29% 
24% 
29% 
11% 
– 
1% 
10% 38.1% 0% 64% 21% 14% – 
25% 33.0% 0% 64% 29% 7% – 
50% 29.6% 7% 64% 18% 7% 4% 
75% 25.1% 39% 36% 25% 0% 0% 
100 km 1,000 
1% 40.0% 0% 
6% 
67% 
66% 
15% 
20% 
19% 
8% 
– 
0% 
10% 35.8% 0% 65% 27% 8% – 
25% 34.1% 0% 80% 12% 8% – 
50% 32.8% 0% 72% 24% 4% 0% 
75% 26.0% 30% 48% 22% 0% 0% 
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Hypothesis 2’, we can indirectly suggest that 
hypothesis 2’ holds. 
 
DISCUSSION 
If the assumption of the rational economic 
human (‘homo economicus’) is true, externality 
will be ignored. However, this study’s results 
suggest that 66% (=7% + 59%) of subjects 
behave altruistically, while the remaining 34% 
(=25% + 9%) behave selfishly—that is, only 
one-third of subjects behave in a manner 
consistent with the assumptions of mainstream 
economics, with the majority of subjects 
behaving quite differently. In this paper, we 
provided two hypotheses and empirically 
examined them through the use of an 
experimental economic method. The results 
showed that hypothesis 1 holds and is 
statistically confirmed. On the other hand, the 
results vis-à-vis hypothesis 2 were ambiguous: 
we provided the modified hypothesis 2’, and 
our results showed that while hypothesis 2’ 
may hold, it is not statistically verified. The 
above results show that, unlike the 
assumptions inherent in mainstream 
economics, many people may behave 
altruistically, and that as the extent of 
externality increases, people tend to be more 
altruistic. There are some existing examples 
that suggest that textbook approaches to 
environmental management are not 
appropriate for resolving real-world problems 
(see for example, Howarth, 1996, p. 31); our 
case provides another such example. 
Venkatachalam (2008) states that, in the real 
economic activities, experimental and 
behavioural economic studies have revealed 
that rational behaviours are not necessarily 
observed. These results seem to accord with 
real-life environmental issues. For example, in 
the case of greenhouse gases such as CO2, there 
are a number of sources of generation. In such 
cases, the externality effect of each source of 
generation should be substantially small, and 
so that effect would not be considered in that 
source’s decision-making. This is the same 
phenomenon as seen with the food basket, 
described by Hardin (1968) in the Tragedy of 
Commons. If we consider sound the 
assumption of the rational economic human, 
the results of this paper are perverse indeed. 
However, if we assume that externality can 
happen when the effect of each subject is 
substantially small, then the results of this 
paper are fairly appropriate. The fallacy of 
composition is well-known within the basic 
theory of economics, where what is true for one 
subject may not true for all subjects as a whole. 
The same logic can be applied in cases of 
natural resource use, as described in this paper. 
Even when the external effect of each subject is 
substantially small, the total effect is no longer 
insignificant, but we often misunderstand this 
fact. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that 
when the externality that a subject exerts is 
large, the subject will tend to behave in a more 
altruistic manner. When planning policy, it is 
essential to consider the existence and effect of 
the altruistic economic human. The proportion 
of altruistic economic humans within a given 
society may depend on the condition of that 
society. For example, Wildmana and 
Hollingsworth (2009, p. 502) examined blood 
donation and state that ‘we find no empirical 
evidence of pure altruism. Rather donation 
appears more a consequence of social norms 
and societal embeddedness’. In addition, 
Grolleau et al. (2009) theoretically show that, 
under some conditions, altruism can be rather 
harmful for the environment. Thus, it is 
necessary to investigate and accumulate 
knowledge on the altruistic economic human. 
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کنیم؟ استفاده از وضعیت ظاهری یک دریاچه به عنوان زمانی برای دیگران احساس تاسف می چه
 نمونه 
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  چکیده
 ظاهره ب ی توجه بیشتر مقتصدهدف از این مطالعه، از طریق استفاده از یک روش تجربی، این بود که این تصور را تایید کند که انسان 
شود. ما از یک میبه آن معطوف یابد، توجه بیشتری افزایش می تظاهردهد که خود ایجاد کرده است و هر چه این از خود نشان می بیرونی
ضای فبا استفاده از یک روش آماری آزمایش کنیم.   ذهنیت رااجتماعی در یک کلاس درس لیسانس استفاده کردیم تا این  - تجربی طرح
موضوعات نوع موارد و  %22 ) در1ا موارد زیر را تایید کرد: نتایج ممورد استفاده قرار گرفت.  نمونهنزدیک دریاچه به عنوان یک  سبزی
هنگامی  )6 ممکن است درست نباشد. یقتصادا تصورات) خودخواهانه بود و نشان داد که  %99در حالی که باقیمانده ( ،دوستانه رفتار شد
های تدارای پلا مقتصد ذی حقی که های انسان مورد بررسی قرار گرفت، ) ، فضای سبزمنابع طبیعی (برای مثالقطعات در  که این وضیعت
 مقتصدجایی که وسعت تاثیر انسان  ، درمقایسه شد ی مختلفهاهنگامی که وضیعت) 9. تر بودندمحتاطدر استفاده از منابع بودند، بزرگتر 
اقتصاد لی  علم اصتر بودند اگر چه محتاطبر روی منابع طبیعی بزرگ و کوچک بود، آنهایی که تاثیر بیشتری داشتند، در استفاده از منابع 
واهانه خ، رفتار نوع دوستانه بر رفتار خودمنطقی خود خواه باشد مقتصدیک انسان در مواردی که قرار است که  گذاردیرا بر این ماصلی فرض 
 .گذاری باید مورد توجه بیشتری قرار گیردو اینکه این رفتار نوع دوستانه در هنگام سیاست کندپیدا میغالبیت 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
